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I. A Story of Stories
The current legal framework governing insider

trading is a rich fabric of interwoven stories constructed
on a loom of law and regulation. Despite securities law at
times gaining a reputation for being cumbersome and
onerous, 1 the stories underlying insider trading
regulation are usually vibrant and engaging.

For example, although Rule lOb-5 is the
foundation of insider trading regulation, Milton Freeman
has famously and fascinatingly recounted the thinness of
its drafting history:

I was sitting in my office in the S.E.C.
building in Philadelphia and I received a
call from Jim Treanor who was then the
Director of the Trading and Exchange
Division. He said, "I have just been on the

telephone with Paul Rowen," who was then
the S.E.C. Regional Administrator in
Boston, "and he has told me about the
president of some company in Boston who
is going around buying up the stock of his

company from his own shareholders at
$4.00 a share, and he has been telling them
1 See Donald C. Langevoort, United States Securities
Regulation and Global Competition, 3 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 191,
192 (2008) ("Various well-publicized, bipartisan blue-ribbon
committee reports have criticized U.S. securities regulation for
being unduly cumbersome, and, in part, blamed overregulation
for a loss of competitiveness in the global capital
marketplace."); A.C. Pritchard, Securities Law in the Roberts
Court: Agenda or Indifference?, 37 J. CORP. L. 105, 106 (2011)
("To outsiders, securities law is not all that interesting. The
body of the law consists of an interconnecting web of statutes
and regulations that fit together in ways that are decidedly
counter-intuitive. Securities law rivals tax law in its reputation
for complexity and dreariness.").
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that the company is doing very badly,

whereas, in fact, the earnings are going to
be quadrupled and will be $2.00 a share for
this coming year. Is there anything we can
do about it?" So he came upstairs and I
called in my secretary and I looked at
Section 10(b) and I looked at Section 17,
and I put them together, and the only
discussion we had there was where "in
connection with the purchase or sale"
should be, and we decided it should be at
the end.
We called the Commission and we
got on the calendar, and I don't remember
whether we got there that morning or after
lunch. We passed a piece of paper around
to all the commissioners. All the
commissioners read the rule and they
tossed it on the table, indicating approval.

Nobody said anything except Sumner Pike
who said, "Well," he said, "we are against
fraud, aren't we?" That is how it
happened. 2
In addition to containing an affirmative fraud by the
president of the company, the story also suggests that he
might have been trading on some undisclosed inside
information about the prospects of the firm as well. 3
Although the SEC promulgated Rule lOb-5 in
1942,

it

waited

until

1961

in

an

administrative

proceeding, In re Cady, Roberts & Co., to clarify its
application to insider trading. 4 The Supreme Court of the
United States has adopted and summarized the test for
insider trading from this proceeding as follows: "(i) the
existence of a relationship affording access to inside
2 Milton V. Freeman, AdministrativeProcedures, 22 BUS. LAW.

891, 922 (1967).
3 Id.
4In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961).
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information intended to be available only for a corporate
purpose, and (ii) the unfairness of allowing a corporate
insider to take advantage of that information by trading
without disclosure." 5 As a consequence, while no general
duty to disclose information exists, the reason why this
nondisclosure of information becomes actionable is
because of a breach of a fiduciary duty. 6 Importantly, the
Court has been careful to clarify that insider trading
occurs under Rule 10b-5 only when there is a
"manipulation or deception." 7 As a result, in cases of
failure to disclose information obtained from a breach of
fiduciary duty, one is looking for "secret profits" that
result from trading on information from that breach. 8
Behind each major innovation or clarification of
insider trading regulation has been a fascinating story.
In Chiarella, the story of a "markup man" stealing
information from a financial printer revealed the
classical theory of insider trading; 9 in Dirks, the story of
a former business executive and a broker-dealer
attempting to expose accounting fraud revealed the
regulation of tipper-tippee liability;1 0 and in O'Hagan,

the story of a rogue
attorney revealed the
misappropriation
theory."
Even the unrealized
watershed opinions in insider trading law offer useful
teaching tools in terms of their fact patterns. For
example, the stories underlying Chiarellaand Carpenter
both
provide
rich
narratives
in which
the
misappropriation theory of insider trading could have

5 Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 227 (1980).
6 Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 654 (1983); Chiarella,445 U.S. at
227-29.
7 Dirks, 463 U.S. at 654 (quoting Santa Fe Industries, Inc. v.
Green, 430 U.S. 462, 473).
8 Id.
9 Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 224.
10 Dirks, 463 U.S. at 648-49.
11 United States v. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 647-48 (1997).
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been recognized but was not adopted by the Court. 12
Of course, insider trading regulation in the United
States is not limited to the nondisclosure of information
obtained through a breach of fiduciary duty, which is
rendered unlawful by section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5.
Section 16(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
renders certain short swing profits by directors, officers,
and beneficial owners forfeit to the issuer of the
securities. 13 The stories underlying section 16(b) cases
tend not to be page-turners based on the complexity of
the application of this statute. 14 However, the story

behind Rule 14e-3(a)-which places a draconian
prohibition on trading on information regarding a tender
offer regardless of whether a misrepresentation,
deception, or breach of fiduciary duty occurs-is
interesting. 15 In the wake of Chiarella, a case that the
SEC lost, the Commission promulgated Rule 14e-3(a) as
a means of ensuring that they would never lose a similar
case again. 16 Because the Rule places a very strong
prohibition on trading on material non-public
information regarding tender offers, it is actually an
affront to the underlying theory behind federal securities

12 Carpenter v. United States, 484 U.S. 19 (1987) (involving a

reporter stealing information from the Wall Street Journalfor
purposes of trading in securities impacted by the information).
13 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (2020).
14 See, e.g., Foremost-McKesson, Inc. v. Provident Sec. Co., 423

U.S. 232 (1976); Reliance Elec. Co. v. Emerson Elec. Co., 404
U.S. 418 (1972).
15 17 C.F.R. 240.14e-3(a) (2019).
16 See Franklin A. Gevurtz,
The Globalization of Insider
Trading Prohibitions,15 TRANSNAT'L LAW. 63, 81 (2002) ("As a
reaction to the Chiarella decision, the SEC used its rulemaking
authority under Section 14(e) of the Securities Exchange Act to
adopt Rule 14e-3(a)."); Zohar Goshen & Gideon Parchomovsky,
On Insider Trading, Markets, and "Negative"PropertyRights
in Information, 87 VA. L. REV. 1229, 1230 n.5 (2001)
("Following Chiarella, in an attempt to narrow the scope of the
holding, the SEC enacted Rule 14e-3(a).").
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regulation, i.e., full and fair disclosure. 17 The moral of the
story: Don't mess with the SEC.
The question that remains is this: what stories are
left to be told regarding insider trading regulation?
Perhaps, unsurprisingly, many of these stories relate to
how this area of law intersects with technology,
especially concerns relating to data protection and
cybersecurity.
Some of the application of existing insider trading
regulation is relatively straight-forward. For example,
the SEC charged two former Equifax employees with
insider trading based on their alleged trading in the wake
of the Equifax data breach that exposed social security
numbers
and
other
personal
information
of
approximately 148 million people in 2017.18 Assuming
the allegations are true, such a case in which an employee
trades upon material non-public information of a data
breach prior to its disclosure offers a relatively easy
example of a violation of existing insider trading law. 19
At best, it serves as a cautionary tale that companies
need to have policies and procedures in place to ensure
17 See SEC v. Capital Gains Res. Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180,
186 (1963) ("A fundamental purpose, common to [all federal
securities laws], was to substitute a philosophy of full
disclosure for the philosophy of caveat emptor and thus to
achieve a high standard of business ethics in the securities
industry.").
18 See Press Release, SEC, Former Equifax Executive Charged
with Insider Trading (Mar. 14, 2018), https://www.sec.gov/new
s/press-release/2018-40; Press Release, SEC, Former Equifax

Manager Charged with Insider Trading (June 28, 2018),
https://www.sec.gov/news/press-release/2018-115.
19 See SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 848 (2d
Cir. 1968) ("[A]nyone in possession of material inside
information must either disclose it to the investing public, or,
if he is disabled from disclosing it in order to protect a corporate
confidence, or he chooses not to do so, must abstain from
trading in or recommending the securities concerned while
such inside information remains undisclosed.").
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that employees do not engage in insider trading in the
wake of cybersecurity incidents, and to ensure prompt
public disclosure of these incidents.20
More interesting issues emerge when a hacker
obtains and trades on material nonpublic information.
Notably, in cases governed by the Cady Roberts rule, i.e.,
matters involving failure to disclose material nonpublic
information prior to trading, a breach of fiduciary duty to
the source of the information is required, and a hacker in
many instances will have no duty to the source. If the
hacker uses a deception to gain access to the information,
the individual has still violated section 10(b) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Rule lOb-5
promulgated thereupon, assuming the other elements
have been met because fraud has still occurred based
upon a material misrepresentation being used for
financial gain.2 1 However, if a hacker merely exploits a
weakness in software to obtain material nonpublic
information, the law is unclear whether this is a violation
20 The SEC has provided guidance to public companies that
suggest such an approach to dealing with cybersecurity
incidents. See Commission Statement and Guidance on Public
Company Cybersecurity Disclosures, Securities Act Release
No. 10,459, Exchange Act Release No. 82,746, 2018 WL
993646, *2 (Feb. 21, 2018) ("Public companies should have
policies and procedures in place to (1) guard against directors,
officers, and other corporate insiders taking advantage of the
period between the company's discovery of a cybersecurity
incident and public disclosure of the incident to trade on
material nonpublic information about the incident, and (2) help
ensure that the company makes timely disclosure of any
related material nonpublic information.").
21 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2020); 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2020); see
Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 552
U.S. 148, 157 (2008) ("In a typical § 10(b) private action a
plaintiff must

prove

(1) a material misrepresentation

or

omission by the defendant; (2) scienter; (3) a connection
between the misrepresentation or omission and the purchase
or sale of a security; (4) reliance upon the misrepresentation or
omission; (5) economic loss; and (6) loss causation.").
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of section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5.
The current story regarding the intersection of
hacking and insider trading is that of Oleksandr
Dorozhko, a Ukrainian hacker held liable for violating
section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5. 22 Importantly, because that
story ended in an unopposed motion for summary
judgment against Dorozhko, the law remains unclear as
to whether a hacker who merely exploits a weakness in
software to obtain material nonpublic information has
violated section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5. This essay will
present Dorozhko's story and explore possible endings to
the legal issues that it left unresolved.
The remainder of this essay will be structured as
follows. Part II will provide an overview of Oleksandr
Dorozhko's story including the allegations against him
and the subsequent litigation. Part III discusses the

uncertainty in the law created by Dorozhko's story in
terms of what is covered by insider trading regulation
and section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 generally regarding
hacking. Finally, Part IV discusses various solutions to
this uncertainty including common law created by the
courts, congressional legislation, or rulemaking by the
SEC. Further, Part IV argues that although
congressional legislation is most desirable, SEC
rulemaking is likely the most feasible means for
resolving how section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 interface with
hacking. This Essay also contains a sample rule that
could be adopted by the SEC.
II. The Story of Oleksandr Dorozhko
Perhaps

unsurprisingly,

the

information

regarding Dorozhko, an accused foreign-born hacker, is
relatively thin. Most of the available information relating
to his story comes from the litigation itself. In addition,
because Dorozhko exercised his Fifth Amendment right
22 See infra Part II (providing the story of Oleksandr Dorozhko).

[76]
8

SCHRODINGER'S HACKER
15 TENN. J.L. & POLY 69 (2020)

against self-incrimination and did not testify during the
case, some of the underlying facts likely remain open to
dispute. 23 Although the District Court did ultimately
grant the SEC's unopposed motion for summary
judgment in civil court, Dorozhko was not convicted in a
criminal proceeding, and as a result, he remains innocent
until proven guilty. Nevertheless, the allegations that
can be pieced together do tell a compelling story that
presents an unresolved and complex issue regarding the
types of behavior rendered unlawful under section 10(b)
and Rule 10b-5.
A. A Hacker's Tale
At the time of the alleged unlawful activity,
Oleksandr Dorozhko was a Ukrainian citizen in his early
fifties residing in Uzhgorod, Ukraine. 24 He worked as a
self-employed engineering consultant in the energy
industry, and he had an income of approximately $45,000
to $50,000 per year. 2 5 His net worth was between
$100,000 to $250,000.
Although Dorozhko invoked his Fifth Amendment
right against self-incrimination and did not testify during
the case, the SEC presented evidence suggesting that the
following events occurred during October 2007. On
October 4, 2007, Dorozhko transferred $42,500 to
Interactive Brokers LLC, a registered broker-dealer in
Greenwich, Connecticut, to open an online trading
account. 26 Beginning at 8:06 am on October 17, 2007 and
continuing throughout

that morning and the early

afternoon, a hacker began probing a website of IMS
Health, a publicly-traded company headquartered in
Norwalk, Connecticut. 27 The website was hosted by
SEC v. Dorozhko, 606 F.Supp.2d 321, 322 (2008).
Id. at 324.
25
Id. at 325.
23

24
26

Id.

27 Id.
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Thompson
Financial,
a division
of Thompson
Corporation, that assisted many Fortune 500 companies
with investor relations matters. 28 IMS Health had stated
publicly as early as October 9 that it would announce its
third quarter earnings on October 17, 2007 around 5:00
pm. 29 At 2:01 pm, in preparation for the announcement,
IMS Health sent slides containing its earnings report to
Thompson Financial.3 0 Thompson Financial formatted

the slides and uploaded them to a secure server with the
intent that they be kept confidential until the
announcement later that day. 31 At 2:15 pm, the hacker
probed the Thompson Financial network and located the
slides. 32 By 2:18 pm, the hacker had downloaded and
viewed the slides containing the IMS earnings report. 33
According to the SEC, beginning at 2:52 pm,
Dorozhko for the first time began using the online trading
account that he had established with Interactive Brokers
LLC. By 3:06 pm, he had acquired $41,670.90 of put
options that would expire on October 25 and 30, 2007.34
At 4:33 pm, after the close of market, IMS Health
released its disappointing third quarter earnings
information to the public. 35 At 9:30 am on October 18,
2007, the market opened, and IMS Health's stock
plunged 28%.36 At 9:35 am, Dorozhko began selling the
put options that he had purchased using the online
trading account. 37 By 9:41 am, he had sold all of the
options that he purchased the previous day at a net profit
of $286,456.59.38
28 Id.
29 Dorozhko, 606 F.Supp.2d at 325 (2008).
30

Id.

31 Id. at 325-26.
32

Id. at 326.
33 Id.
34 Id.
35 Dorozhko, 606 F.Supp.2d at 326 (2008).
Id.
37 Id.
36

38

Id. at 327.
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Shortly thereafter, Interactive Brokers LLC froze
Dorozhko's account to conduct an internal investigation
that led the matter to be referred to the SEC.3 9 On
October 29, 2007, the SEC filed for and received in the
United States District Court for the Southern District of
New York a temporary restraining order to freeze the
proceeds from Dorozhko's trades and for other related
relief. 40
B. SEC v. Dorozhko
The district court ultimately granted the SEC's
unopposed

motion

for

summary

judgment

against

Dorozhko for violating section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5
because of his activities. 4 1 However, the path to this
outcome was not as easy as easy as it sounds.

Initially, the district court denied the SEC's
motion for a preliminary injunction on the basis that the
allegations against Dorozhko did not constitute insider
trading under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 because of the
lack of a breach of fiduciary. 42 Writing for the court,
Judge Naomi Reice Buchwald held:
Dorozhko's alleged 'stealing and trading' or
'hacking and trading' does not amount to a
violation of § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 because
Dorozhko did not breach any fiduciary or
similar

duty

"in connection

with"

the

purchase or sale of a security. Although
Dorozhko may have broken the law, he is
not liable in a civil action under § 10(b)
because he owed no fiduciary or similar
39 Id.
40 Id.
41 SEC Obtains Summary Judgment Against Computer Hacker
for Insider Trading, SEC Litigation Release No. 21,465 (Mar.
29, 2010), https://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/2010/lr214
65.htm.
42 SEC v. Dorozhko, 606 F.Supp.2d 321, 324 (2008).
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duty either to the source of his information
or to those he transacted with in the
market. 43

In essence, the court held that Dorozhko could not be held
liable under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 because he did
not violate the Cady Roberts rule that governs insider
trading regulation. 44 Notably, the district court also
denied Dorozhko's motion to dismiss to allow the SEC
time to conduct discovery to determine whether
Dorozhko's trading was the result of a tip from a
corporate insider. 45
The United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit reversed the district court and held that a hacker
could violate section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 in the absence
of a breach of fiduciary duty if the hacker traded upon
material nonpublic information obtained through a
deception. 46 The Second Circuit held that a breach of
fiduciary duty is only required to establish a deception for
purposes of a violation of section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 in
cases involving nondisclosure in trading based upon
material nonpublic information. 4 7 The court held that
misrepresenting

one's

identity

to

gain

access

to

information would be enough to constitute a deception for
purposes of a violation of section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5. 48
However, the court also held that it is less clear as to
whether "exploiting an electronic code to gain
unauthorized access is 'deceptive,' rather than being
mere theft." 49 Consequently, the Second Circuit
remanded the case to determine whether Dorozhko's
behavior was "deceptive" under section 10(b) and Rule

43 Id.

44 Id.
45 Id.
46 SEC v. Dorozhko, 574 F.3d 42, 43-44 (2009).
47 Id. at 46-49.
48 Id.
49 Id.
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lOb-5. 50 As a result of this remand, when Dorozhko
stopped participating in the litigation, the district court

granted the SEC's unopposed motion for summary
judgment against him for violating section 10(b) and Rule
lOb-5 because of his activities. 51

III. Schrodinger's Hacker

Dorozhko's story is fascinating because whether
or not he committed the acts necessary to violate section
10(b) and Rule lOb-5 remains unclear. As discussed
previously, Dorozhko exercised his Fifth Amendment
right against self-incrimination, and the District Court
ultimately granted the SEC's unopposed motion for
summary judgment, which casts doubt upon how he
gained access to IMS Health's earnings information.

Manipulative or deceptive conduct is required to violate
section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5, and such conduct may or
may not have actually occurred in Dorozhko's case.
Hinging liability under section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 on
such nuanced factual determinations is problematic for
the risk that it creates to the stability of capital markets
in the United States.
To understand why the Second Circuit's holding
in Dorozhko is troubling, one should consider the
following two hypotheticals. In hypothetical one, a hacker
sends a company executive a phishing email that appears

to be from the company's information technology
department, and as a result, the hacker is able to obtain
the executive's username and password. The hacker uses
the username and password to gain access to the
company's online electronic document system and trades
based upon an earnings report that has not been released
50

Id.

51 SEC Obtains Summary Judgment Against Computer Hacker
for Insider Trading, SEC Litigation Release No. 21,465 (Mar.
29, 2010), https://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/2010/lr214
65.htm.
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to the public. In hypothetical two, a hacker discovers a
weakness in the design of a company's online electronic
document system. As a result, the hacker trades based
upon an unreleased earnings report that the hacker is
able to obtain because of the weakness.
Despite the fact that both hypotheticals involve
trading upon material nonpublic information that was
obtained in morally questionable ways, under the Second
Circuit's holding in Dorozhko's case, the coverage of
section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 remains uncertain. Neither
hypothetical fits within nondisclosure insider trading
under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 because although the
hacker has likely breached a number of laws, the hacker
has not breached a fiduciary duty. However, insider
trading regulation extends beyond nondisclosure insider
trading. 52 The affirmative misrepresentation found in the
phishing email in hypothetical one is likely enough for it
to be rendered unlawful based on a traditional securities
fraud analysis under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5. In the
absence of a misrepresentation, hypothetical two is
probably not a violation of these provisions. As Milton
Freeman's story at the beginning of this Essay reveals,
Rule 10b-5 is only designed to render fraud unlawful. In
the absence of a deception, fraud cannot exist. 53
Regardless, both hypotheticals are equally troubling in
regard to investor protection and market stability.
With that said, however, the result is not
absolutely certain. Assuming the matter eventually
reaches the Supreme Court, the Court could hold that the
behavior in hypothetical two constitutes a "deception" for
purposes of section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5. However, such
a result is unlikely based on the Roberts Court's
unwillingness to innovate and expand the limits of
federal securities regulation. 54 This is especially true
52 See supra notes 13-17 and accompanying text.
53 See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
54

See Eric C. Chaffee, The Supreme Court as Museum Curator:
Securities Regulation and the Roberts Court, 67 CAsE W. RES.
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because the Second Circuit, which decided Dorozhko's
case, is no longer viewed as the "Mother Court" for
innovations in securities regulation. 55 The Court could
even decide that hypothetical one is not a violation of
section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 because the deception is not
closely enough connected with the purchase or sale of a
security.

Beyond the uncertainty and inconsistent results
created by hacking in hypotheticals one and two, hacking
creates other concerns relating to tampering with stock
prices.
Consider the
following
two
additional
hypotheticals. In hypothetical three, a hacker engages in
a spoofing attack, which is a specific type of denial of
service attack that allows the hacker to deceptively
appear to be a large number of different users to
overwhelm and shut down a website. The hacker chooses
to shut down a publicly traded web-based company's
website and causes the website to be offline for a week.
Prior to undertaking the attack, the hacker purchases
put options based on the material non-public information
that the website is vulnerable. In hypothetical four, a
hacker chooses to shut down a publicly traded web-based
company's website and causes the website to be offline for
a week, after the hacker discovers that entering certain
information into the company's website will stop it from
functioning. Prior to undertaking the attack, the hacker
purchases put options based on the material non-public
information that the website is vulnerable.

.

L. REv. 847, 854 (2017) (" [T]he Roberts Court is playing the role
of museum curator in regard to securities regulation by
preserving the artifacts created by Supreme Court precedent.
. . [T]he days of an activist Court in the area of securities
regulation have long past.").

55 Id. at 879-80 ("Justice Harry Blackmun famously referred to
the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit as
the 'Mother Court' in the field of securities regulation. . . . The
Roberts Court has ended the Second Circuit's role as the
'Mother Court' and the lower court laboratories approach in
regard to the development of securities law . . .. ").

[83]
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Hypothetical three and four present similar
concerns as hypothetical one and two. Hypotheticals one
and three are likely violations of section 10(b) and Rule
10b-5, and the result in hypotheticals two and four are
highly uncertain. However, all of the hypotheticals
demonstrate that hacking poses a danger to the stability
of capital markets in the United States.
These

hypotheticals

display

an

interesting

parallel with the thought experiment, known as
"Schrdinger's cat," posed by Austrian physicist Erwin
Schrodinger in 1935 to demonstrate his issue with the
Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics.56
Specifically, he was concerned about this interpretation's
reliance on quantum superpositions, in which a quantum

system such as an atom or photon can exist as a
combination of multiple states until directly observed. 57
In describing the thought experiment, Schrodinger
wrote:

One can even set up quite ridiculous cases.
A cat is penned up in a steel chamber,
along with the following device (which
must
be
secured
against
direct
interference by the cat): in a Geiger
counter there is a tiny bit of radioactive
substance, so small, that perhaps in the
course of the hour one of the atoms decays,
but also, with equal probability, perhaps
none; if it happens, the counter tube
discharges and through a relay releases a
hammer which shatters a small flask of
hydrocyanic acid. If one has left this entire
system to itself for an hour, one would say
56

Erwin Schr6dinger, Die gegenwartige Situation in der

Quantenmechanik, 23 NATURWISSENSCHAFTEN 807-12, 82328, 844-49 (1935), translatedin John D. Trimmer, The Present
Situation in Quantum Mechanics, 124 PROCEEDINGS OF THE
AM. PHIL. SoC'Y 323, 328 (1980).
57 Id.
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that the cat still lives if meanwhile no atom
has decayed. The psi-function of the entire
system would express this by having in it
the living and dead cat (pardon the
expression) mixed or smeared out in equal
parts.
It is typical of these cases that an

indeterminacy originally restricted to the
atomic domain becomes transformed into
macroscopic indeterminacy, which can
then be resolved by direct observation.
That prevents us from so naively accepting

as valid a "blurred model" for representing
reality. 58

Put simply, Schrdinger's thought experiment illustrates
that small facts-for example, the state of an atom-can
create unacceptable indeterminacy in larger systemsfor example, allowing a cat to be simultaneously alive and
dead at the same time.
Similarly, how a hacker obtains material
nonpublic information seems as though it ought to be
trivial in regard to punishing under federal securities
regulation because in all instances, the hacker is stealing
information, and the hacking poses a danger to the
stability of capital markets in the United States.
However, similar to the Schrdinger's cat thought
experiment, the relatively trivial issue of how the hacker
obtains the information creates unacceptable large-scale
uncertainty as to whether such behavior can be pursued
under federal securities regulation.
IV. The End of the Story
The behavior found in all of the hypotheticals is
almost certainly punishable under United States law.
However, federal securities regulation is designed to
58 Id.
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encourage investor confidence in the capital markets. As
a result, hacking in all four of the hypotheticals ought to
be rendered unlawful under federal securities regulation,
especially because the SEC's actions in Dorozhko and
similar cases suggest that the agency is interested in
pursuing such behavior. Three potential pathways exist
for this to occur, including common law created by the
courts, congressional legislation, or rulemaking by the
SEC. Although a congressional enactment is most
desirable, SEC rulemaking is likely the most feasible
means for resolving the issues created by trading on
material nonpublic information related to data breaches
by hackers.
A few words ought to be said about each of the
pathways for resolving this issue. First, the courts could
ultimately determine that all hacking is a deceptive act
under section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5. This pathway is
unpalatable because it would likely take a very long time
for a case to reach the Supreme Court, and the Court is
no longer willing to innovate in regard to federal
securities law. 59

Second, Congress can and should amend section
10(b) to entail all forms of hacking within the purview of
that provision. Although such an undertaking would
likely create redundancies within existing federal law,
because the federal securities law exists at least in part
to encourage market confidence, such an undertaking
would help to raise investor confidence. In the wake of
the Equifax data breach and other cyberattacks,
Congress has at least 148 million stories of individuals
who are concerned about hacking. Congress should make
it unequivocally clear that hacking that interferes with
the efficient operation of the capital markets will not be
tolerated.
Notably, at the time writing of this essay, the
59 See supra note 54 and accompanying text (discussing that
the Roberts Court has worked to maintain the status quo
regarding most substantive issues of securities regulation).
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United States House of Representatives had passed the
Insider Trading Prohibition Act.60 The bill provides a
broader prohibition against insider trading than
currently exists under federal law and would modify
existing federal securities law to include the following
provision:

It shall be unlawful for any person, directly
or indirectly, to purchase, sell, or enter
into, or cause the purchase or sale of or
entry into, any security, security-based
swap, or security-based swap agreement,

while aware of material, nonpublic
information relating to such security,
security-based swap, or security-based
swap

agreement,

or

any

nonpublic

information, from whatever source, that
has, or would reasonably be expected to
have, a material effect on the market price
of any such security, security-based swap,
or security-based swap agreement, if such
person knows, or recklessly disregards,
that such information has been obtained
wrongfully, or that such purchase or sale
would constitute a wrongful use of such
information. 6 1
In defining the type of "wrongful" conduct would be
rendered unlawful, the drafters include use of
"information [that] has been obtained by, or its
communication or use would constitute, directly or
indirectly ...
a violation of any Federal law protecting
computer data or the intellectual property or privacy of
computer users." 6 2 Importantly, even if this bill is passed
by the Senate and alters federal securities law,
hypothetical four in which a hacker exploits a weakness
60 H.R. 2534, 116th Cong. (as passed by the House, Dec. 5,
2019).
61
Id. at § 2(a).
62 Id.
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in a website to shut down a web-based company and then
trades in the company's securities likely would still not
be covered by federal law. With that said, this result is
not entirely certain because of the breadth of the
language contained under the Insider Trading
Prohibition Act.63 Regardless, the uncertain coverage
potentially would still jeopardize the confidence in the
capital markets that federal securities law is designed to
protect. Even if the Insider Trading Prohibition Act

becomes law, additional steps would be needed to remove
uncertainty in regard to the intersection of hacking and
the behavior rendered unlawful by section 10(b) and Rule
1Ob-5.
Third, the SEC could promulgate a rule
interpreting the language of section 10(b) and Rule lOb5 to include all hacking as "deceptive acts or
contrivances." The concern with this approach is that the
SEC's power is limited to the power that Congress has
authorized, and as a result, promulgating such a rule
may be beyond the SEC's authority if it increases the
coverage of section 10(b). However, The SEC has clarified
the coverage of section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 in past by
enacting provisions such as Rule 10b-5-2, which clarifies
when duties of trust or confidence exist for cases
involving the misappropriation theory of insider
trading.6 4
In regard to hacking, the SEC could promulgate
the following:
(a) For purposes of section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5, material
misrepresentations or omissions include:
(1) intentionally accessing a computer without

authorization or exceeding authorized access, and
thereby obtaining information from any protected
computer;

(2) intentionally, without authorization to access
63
64

Id.
17 C.F.R.

§ 240.10b5-2 (2020).
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any nonpublic computer of a department or
agency of the United States, accessing such a
computer of that department or agency that is
exclusively for the use of the Government of the
United States or, in the case of a computer not
exclusively for such use, is used by or for the
Government of the United States and such
conduct affects that use by or for the Government
of the United States;
(3)
(A) knowingly causing the transmission of
a program, information, code, or command,
and as a result of such conduct,
intentionally causing damage without
authorization, to a protected computer;
(B) intentionally

accessing

a protected

computer without authorization, and as a
result of such conduct, recklessly causing
damage; or
(C) intentionally

accessing

a protected

computer without authorization, and as a
result of such conduct, causing damage
and loss.
(b) As used in this section(1) the term "computer" means an electronic,
magnetic, optical, electrochemical, or other high
speed data processing device performing logical,
arithmetic, or storage functions, and includes any
data storage facility or communications facility
directly related to or operating in conjunction with
such device, but such term does not include an
automated typewriter or typesetter, a portable

hand held calculator, or other similar device;
(2) the term "protected computer"

means a

computer-

(A) exclusively for the use of a financial
[89]
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institution
or
the
United
States
Government, or, in the case of a computer
not exclusively for such use, used by or for
a financial institution or the United States
Government and the conduct constituting
the offense affects that use by or for the
financial institution or the Government; or
(B) which is used in or affecting interstate
or foreign commerce or communication,
including a computer located outside the
United States that is used in a manner
that affects interstate or foreign commerce
or communication of the United States;
(3) the term "financial institution" means(A) an institution, with deposits insured by
the
Federal
Deposit
Insurance

Corporation;
(B) the Federal Reserve or a member of the
Federal Reserve including any Federal
Reserve Bank;
(C) a credit union with accounts insured by
the National Credit Union Administration;
(D) a member of the Federal home loan
bank system and any home loan bank;
(E) any institution of the Farm Credit
System under the Farm Credit Act of 1971;
(F) a broker-dealer registered with the
Securities and Exchange Commission
pursuant to section 15 of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934;
(G)

the

Securities

Investor

Protection

Corporation;
(H) a branch or agency of a foreign bank (as
such terms are defined in paragraphs (1)
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and (3) of section 1(b) of the International
Banking Act of 1978); and

(I) an organization operating under section

25 or section 25(a) 1 of the Federal Reserve
Act;
(4) the term "exceeding authorized access" means
to access a computer with authorization and to use
such access to obtain or alter information in the
computer that the accessor is not entitled so to
obtain or alter;
(5) the term "department of the United States"
means the legislative or judicial branch of the
Government or one of the executive departments
enumerated in section 101 of title 5;
(6) the term "damage" means any impairment to
the integrity or availability of data, a program, a

system, or information;
(7) the term "government entity" includes the
Government of the United States, any State or
political subdivision of the United States, any
foreign

country,

and

any

state,

province,

municipality, or other political subdivision of a
foreign country; and
(8) the term "loss" means any reasonable cost to
any victim, including the cost of responding to an
offense, conducting a damage assessment, and
restoring

the

data,

program,

system,

or

information to its condition prior to the offense,
and any revenue lost, cost incurred, or other
consequential damages incurred because of
interruption of service.6 5

65 This proposed rule is based upon 18 U.S.C.

§ 1030, which is
known as the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act. Much of the
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Such a rule would clarify that section 10(b) and Rule lOb5 covers all four of the hypotheticals discussed above and
would help to promote market confidence and stability by
insulating investors from the evils of hacking. Beyond
that, such a rule would address the due process and
notice concerns that linger in the wake of Dorozhko, 66
especially because violations of the federal securities law
can be prosecuted criminally. 67
Two major complaints might be lodged against the
proposed rule. First, one might argue that the proposed
rule is duplicative of existing federal law. In actuality,
that alleged weakness is actually a strength. The
proposed rule is modeled upon 18 U.S.C. § 1030, which is
also known as the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act. Most
of the provisions of the proposed rule are taken from
section 1030, although the proposed rule is narrowed to
the most likely circumstances in which securities fraud
concerns might occur. Because it was enacted in 1986,
section 1030 has a substantial body of case law and
commentary associated with it. By using verbatim text,
the proposed rule has the benefit of being better
developed because the case law and commentary relating
to section 1030 can be used to interpret the meaning of
the provisions of the proposed rule. Of course, this creates
the issue of whether it is beneficial to have an SEC Rule
that is duplicative of existing federal law. In this
instance, having both section 1030 and the proposed rule
would be beneficial. Section 1030 is a general provision of
language contained in the proposed rule is adopted verbatim
from that statute.
66 The Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States
Constitution each contain a due process clause that prevents
the government from depriving individuals of "life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law," and this requirement
applies to civil and criminal matters. See U.S. CONST. amends.
V, XIV.
67 See 15 U.S.C.

§ 77x (2020) (providing criminal penalties for

violating the Securities Act); id. § 78ff (providing criminal
penalties for violating the Exchange Act).
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the federal criminal law found in Title 18 of the United
States. The proposed rule would be used for a very
different purpose, i.e. maintaining the stability in the
capital markets in the United States. Federal securities
law in the United States exists for purposes of market
protection. 68 Hacking has become a major concern in the
United States. The proposed rule, which addresses
hacking in relation to the purchase and sale of securities,
should be included within federal securities law to the
communicate that federal securities law is a coherent and
comprehensive system of regulation that can be relied
upon and trusted.
Second, one might argue that the proposed rule
exceeds the SEC's authority to define the scope of Rule
lOb-5. Rule lOb-5 is promulgated based upon the
authority granted to the SEC under section 10(b) of the
Securities Exchange Act, which mandates that
It shall be unlawful .... [t]o use or employ,
in connection with the purchase or sale of
any security registered on a national
securities exchange or any security not so

registered, or any securities-based swap
agreement any manipulative or deceptive

device or contrivance in contravention of
such rules and regulations as the
Commission may prescribe as necessary or

appropriate in the public interest or for the

68 See Susan B. Heyman, Rethinking Regulation Fair
Disclosure and Corporate Free Speech, 36 CARDOzO L. REV.
1099, 1111 (2015) ("The Exchange Act was enacted after the
1929 stock market crash to restore confidence in the nation's
securities market by governing securities transactions on

secondary markets."); Arthur R. Pinto, The Nature of the
CapitalMarkets Allows a GreaterRole for the Government, 55
BROOK. L. REV. 77, 77 (1989) ("[T]he securities laws were

enacted during the New Deal to insure that our capital
markets remain free from the abuses and fraud that Congress
believed plagued both the sale and trading of securities.").
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protection of investors. 69

Rule 10b-5 is a product of that mandate. Any rule created
by the SEC must remain within the power granted to
them by Congress in section 10(b). One could argue that
the proposed rule would exceed that authority. With that
said, hacking is deceptive in the sense that it is often wed
with attempts to conceal and redirect knowledge of the
hacker's identity.
If the SEC is unwilling to promulgate a rule that
makes certain acts of hacking per se material
misrepresentations or omissions, the agency could
promulgate a rule that creates a rebuttable presumption
that in certain instances involving hacking that a
misrepresentation or omission occurred. This solution
has an elegance because it would force hackers to explain
how they committed their bad acts to escape liability
under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 by rebutting the
presumption. If they did that, then section 1030 could
easily be used to punish their bad behavior.
Hacking has become a ubiquitous concern in our
society. Oleksandr Dorozhko's story illustrates that
federal securities regulation is currently inadequate to
deal with the securities issues associated with hacking,
which poses a threat to the stability of securities markets
in the United States. This Essay offers a proposed rule to
remedy this problem, and it gives the SEC the
opportunity to write the next chapter in this story.

69

15 U.S.C. § 78j (2020).
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